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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey will treat recent decisions by Florida courts which im-
pact the elderly. The cases chart statutory measures which punish
crimes against the elderly, issues bearing on vital medical decisions
over the elderly's right to proper care and treatment, and in some
cases, to die. It covers as well matters dealing with the right of support
and pension benefits sounding in the elderly setting and those issues
unfolding in adult communities. It wraps up with a look at the state of
legal representation for the elderly.
II. MEDICAL ISSUES
In In re Guardianship of Browning,' a landmark ruling, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court delivered a sweeping declaration on a competent or
incompetent person's right to say no to all forms of medical treatment.
It was a ringing endorsement of privacy, personal autonomy, and self-
determination.
In 1.985, Estelle Browning drew up a living will, a document con-
taining instructions on whether aggressive medical care is to be applied
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center; LL.M., Ge-
orgetown Law Center, 1984; J.D., University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall),
1977; B.A. Pomona College, 1974.
1. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
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at life's twilight. Beyond refusing the customary life supports, like res-
pirators, Mrs. Browning also recorded her steadfast opposition to
forced feeding.
The following year, Mrs. Browning suffered a stroke which left her
unable to swallow. Overriding her written directive, the hospital in-
serted a feeding tube directly into her stomach, where it remained for
eighteen uncomfortable months before giving way to a nasogastric
tube. In the meantime, Doris Herbert, Mrs. Browning's court-ap-
pointed guardian, citing the living will, asked the trial court for permis-
sion to cut off the unwanted life line.
In the course of an evidentiary hearing, an earlier living will bear-
ing identical language offered striking proof that Mrs. Browning's in-
tentions were more than casual chatter. Neighbors also testified that,
time and again, Mrs. Browning voiced horror at the prospect of a pro-
tracted death. Grim medical evidence indicated that while not coma-
tose, Mrs. Browning had lapsed into a persistent vegetative state. With-
out the feeding tubes, she would die within ten days. With them, she
could linger in limbo for a year or longer.
The trial court refused to order the tube removed because Mrs.
Browning's death was not imminent. In support of its conclusion, the
court relied on Florida law which at the time flatly ruled out suste-
nance from its definition of "life-prolonging procedure." 2 Reaching out
beyond statutory law, however, the appellate court backed Mrs. Brown-
ing's decision to turn down aggressive intervention,3 citing the right to
privacy embedded in the Florida Constitution as authority.4 The Flor-
ida Supreme Court agreed.'
In sizing up the sweep of Florida's constitutional privacy guaran-
tee, the supreme court opened its analysis with the premise that each
individual holds, as an article of faith, "sole control of his or her per-
son."6 One measure of self-determination, the supreme court noted, "is
the right to make choices pertaining to one's health, including the right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment."7 Citing dicta contained in the
United States Supreme Court ruling in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
2. 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-223. Since October 1, 1990, a patient may authorize
the withholding or withdrawal of nutrition or hydration under certain circumstances.
3. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 267 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
4. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
5. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 4.
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Department of Health,8 the Florida Supreme Court emphasized that a
competent person has a constitutional right to refuse extraordinary
medical intervention without regard to medical condition.9 In support
of this principle, the Florida Supreme Court applauded the result
reached in Bouvia v. Superior Court, a California case sustaining a
competent patient's prerogative to refuse any medical treatment.1"
The supreme court also relied on its earlier decision in Public
Health Trust v. Wons, which recognized the right of a competent and
middle-aged Jehovah's Witness to turn down an emergency blood
transfusion, even though it meant certain death.11 In Wons, the su-
preme court expanded their previous holding by ruling an incompetent
person12 is equally entitled to refuse medical treatment, if such intent
was communicated while the individual was competent.'3
Throughout the balance of the opinion, the supreme court mea-
sured the countervailing interests advanced by the state, against an in-
dividual's bid to refuse medical treatment. 4 It rejected outright the
suggestion that Mrs. Browning may have had a change of heart since
drawing up her living will.' 5 As for the state's interest in preserving
life, a potent argument in the proper setting, the supreme court con-
cluded that this interest is weakened when the question is "not
whether, but when, for how long and at what cost to the individual...
life may be briefly extended."'"
Moreover, the supreme court reasoned that the state's interest in
preventing suicide bears little heft when removing life support merely
lets nature take its course.'7 Finally, it roundly dismissed the idea that
honoring a person's right to halt all life-saving measures somehow com-
promises the integrity of the medical profession.' 8
8. 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990).
9. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10.
10. Id. at 10-11 (citing Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1142-
43 (1986)).
11. 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
12. Reform legislation has since replaced the "incompetency" concept with
"incapacity."
13. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 12 (citing John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984)).
14. Id. at 13-14.
15. Id. at 13.
16. li. at 14.
17. I.
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In what is likely to be its signature feature, the supreme court
firmly cast aside all argument that the judiciary should serve as a
watchdog upon the decision to pull life supports. 9 In a bold stroke, it
held that a court order was not necessary to halt medical treatment, if
"do not resuscitate" instructions are contained either in a living will, or
in oral declarations; or if the decision is arrived at by a proxy author-
ized in writing to make all health care decisions for the patient." Fur-
thermore, life supports may be removed upon evidence of the patient's
intent, without a court order, without regard to whether a surrogate
has been named to carry out the instructions.21
When a patient leaves oral or written "end of life" directions and
designates a proxy to carry out these instructions, common sense safe-
guards are in order. For example, the proxy, with written authority,
must support the patient's decision to remove life supports by clear and
convincing evidence. 22 The surrogate also must be satisfied that the pa-
tient drew up the plans knowingly, willingly, and without undue influ-
ence; and, that the evidence of the patient's oral declarations is relia-
ble.2 3 Beyond this, there must be a medical finding that the patient's
prognosis is hopeless .2 Finally, the surrogate must ensure that the pa-
tient's instructions have been carefully weighed and satisfied.25
When a patient leaves no instructions, except to name someone to
act on her behalf, a couple of conditions must first be met before life
support may be removed. For example, the surrogate must certify that
the proxy authorization was made knowingly, willingly, and without
undue influence. 26 Furthermore, the proxy must obtain the statements
of three physicians that the patient is unlikely to recover. 27
When ambiguity clouds the patient's instructions, or challenges to
the proxy's decision emerge, courts will unavoidably end up breaking
the deadlock. 8 Any proceeding, however, will be streamlined and the
court will only look at conflicting testimony bearing on the patient's




23. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15.
24. Id. at 16.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Id. at 15-16.
27. Id. at 16.
28. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 16.
[Vol. 16
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intent." To move matters along, written proxy authorizations carry a
rebuttable presumption as clear and convincing evidence of the pa-
tient's wishes.30 Likewise, physicians' medical findings draw a rebutta-
ble presumption that the conditions for removal of life support have
been met."1
Not surprisingly, courts note that penned instructions of the pa-
tient's wishes are more reliable evidence, and thus, the written word
draws broader judicial deference.32 Accordingly, while a patient's writ-
ten statements can stand on their own, the surrogate must bear the
burden of proof when her decision to discontinue life support rests on
oral evidence alone, and is challenged.33
In Mrs. Browning's case, the only question which called for judi-
cial resolution was whether her condition was terminal. Reviewing the
medical evidence, the supreme court was satisfied her prognosis was
dim.3 ' Accordingly, it found that the guardian's request to remove the
feeding tube should have been honored. 5
Justice Overton, in dissent, would require court approval whenever
oral declarations by the patient represent the only evidence cited by a
surrogate in the bid to terminate the patient's life supports.3 " Justice
Overton voiced concern over the possibility that proxies may profit fi-
nancially from an early death of the incompetent.37
III. COMMUNITY AGE RESTRICTIONS
Brookridge Community Property Owners v. Brookridge, Inc.38
concerned a dispute over whether age restrictions burdening a retire-
ment community in Hernando County were binding on the owners of
undeveloped lots in the development. The defendant homeowners asso-
ciation recorded age restrictions six years after the plaintiff, the com-
munity's developer, assigned management powers to the defendant.





33. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 16.
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 18 (Overton, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
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out regard to the buyer's age.
Under the disputed restrictions, at least one permanent occupant
had to be at least fifty-five years of age and all permanent occupants
were required to be at least eighteen years of age. While the restriction
only covered about 140 of the 2,856 platted lots that remained undevel-
oped when the covenant was recorded, nearly eighty percent of the oc-
cupied homes already contained at least one person fifty-five years or
older.
The plaintiff developer, who owned the bulk of the undeveloped
lots, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the homeowners
association, claiming that the age rule was unreasonable. Plaintiff's
successful motion for summary judgment persuaded the trial court that
the line drawn by the age rule between improved and unimproved lots,
and the series of exemptions for improved homes, were arbitrary.
In siding with the developer, the trial court reasoned that a rule
which exempts from sixty to ninety-five percent of the lots in question
was not crafted to serve the goal of building an older adult commu-
nity. 39 The court pointed out that it was flatly arbitrary to prohibit
current owners of unimproved lots from building a residence in which
grandchildren might reside.' Accordingly, the homeowners association
was permanently enjoined from enforcing the age rule.'1
While the Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed with the result, it
took issue with the trial court's reasoning.42 Even if the rule was rea-
sonable, the appellate court found that the homeowners association
lacked the authority to enact such a rule in the first place.' 3 The power
to enact age restrictions could not have been assigned by the developer,
the court concluded, because it lacked the authority "to assign as
against owners who purchased lots without notice of age restrictions
"44
IV. ADULT CONGREGATE LIVING FACILITIES
Mang v. Country Comfort Inn,'45 addressed whether an adminis-
trator of a retirement community could be sued for violating a resi-




43. Brookridge, 573 So. 2d at 975.
44. id.
45. 559 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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dent's right, under the Florida Adult Congregate Living Facilities
Act,46 to receive proper medical attention.
Mang suffered injuries after falling in a pool of urine on the floor
of a bathroom at the Country Comfort Inn, an adult congregate living
facility. Not only had Mang lain in the urine unattended overnight, a
full day passed before he was seen by a doctor. The trial court dis-
missed Mang's charge that Perez, the facility's administrator, violated
Mang's statutory rights.
After reviewing Florida's Adult Congregate Living Facilities Act,
the appellate court reinstated Mang's claim against Perez."' The Act
accords residents of adult congregate living facilities the right to live in
a safe and decent living environment, free from abuse and neglect. The
Act also gives residents the right to receive proper health care.4 8 Fi-
nally, it assigns to the administrators of such facilities a continuing
duty to assess whether a resident is "incontinent of bladder and bowel
"149
Under the Act, residents are expressly entitled to press claims
against administrators who fail in their duties as caretakers.50 The ap-
pellate court concluded Mang's second drafting effort stated an ade-
quate case to survive pre-trial challenge." The claim against Perez was
accordingly remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 2
The negligent administration of an adult congregate living facility
drew judicial notice in B.B.A. v. Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services." The defendant, B.B.A., and his wife were the owners,
and the wife was the administrator, of an adult congregate living facil-
ity in which the plaintiff, C.C., a mentally disabled person with a his-
tory of seizures, had resided for several years." While the plaintiff was
hospitalized, a defendant physician prescribed dilantin to control the
seizures." The defendant failed to check plaintiff's dilantin blood level
for seventeen months after the plaintiff left the hospital to return once
46. FLA. STAT. § 400.401 (1987).
47. Mang, 559 So. 2d at 673-75.
48. FLA. STAT. § 400.28 (1987).
49. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.1OA-5.0181(3)(e) (1986) (Adult Congregate Liv-
ing Facilities).
50. FLA. STAT. § 400.29 (1987).
51. Mang, 559 So. 2d at 675.
52. Id.
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again to the defendant's care.56 Subsequently, the plaintiff was re-hos-
pitalized and lapsed into seizures.5
An HRS investigator, suspecting neglect, poured over the plain-
tiff's medical files and interviewed medical personnel. The HRS investi-
gator concluded that the plaintiff was, indeed, a victim of neglect.58
HRS approved the investigator's findings and entered the defendant's
name on its central abuse registry.59 The defendant challenged this
move and requested that HRS expunge the record of neglect.00
In the course of an administrative hearing conducted by HRS, a
neurology specialist testified that a seizure patient's dilantin level
should be checked annually.6 1 Furthermore, the specialist noted that a
caregiver must be acutely alert when handling a mentally disabled indi-
vidual who may not wholly appreciate the importance of taking his
medication regularly. 2
After finding, under Florida law, that the plaintiff was a "disabled
adult"68 and that the defendant was a "caregiver," 6 the hearing officer
ratified the finding of neglect and recommended that HRS deny the
defendant's request to wipe out the registry entry of his neglect.6 " HRS
adopted the hearing officer's recommendations and an appeal
followed.66
The court of appeal addressed the question of whether competent,
substantial evidence supported HRS' finding of neglect.67 Citing the
neurologist's unrebutted testimony and the defendant's admission that
he had not measured the plaintiff's dilantin blood level for seventeen
months, the court affirmed the finding of neglect."
In his defense, the defendant also claimed that HRS failed to con-
nect the defendant's level of care with the plaintiff's subsequent
56. Id.
57. Id. at 957 (Zehmer, J., dissenting).
58. B.B.A., 581 So. 2d at 956.
59. FLA. STAT. § 415.103(3)(c) (1989) (the statute requires that HRS maintain
a central registry and tracking system where all reports of abuse are logged, including
the HRS final disposition indicating the results of its investigation).
60. B.B.A., 581 So. 2d at 956.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. FLA. STAT. § 514.102(8) (1989).
64. FLA. STAT. § 415.102(4) (1989).
65. B.B.A., 581 So. 2d at 956.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 957.
[Vol. 16
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seizures." Unlike tort claims, where doctrines like proximate cause and
contributory negligence must be weighed, the court concluded that
once it was established that the defendant did not take the steps a pru-
dent caregiver would follow, the statutory definition of neglect had
been met.7
The: court's opinion was not unanimous, however. Judge Zehmer,
in dissent, disputed whether competent, substantial evidence proved
that the plaintiffs injury was the outcome of the defendant's failure to
act; in other words, the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defend-
ant's acts were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.71 Judge
Zehmer pointed out that each time the plaintiff entered the hospital,
his dilantin level was satisfactory.72 Given that, the judge noted it was
altogether possible that the plaintiffs dilantin level was normal over the
course of those seventeen months between hospital stays." Moreover,
the judge pointed out that the plaintiffs seizures may not even be
traced to a low dilantin level; the seizures could be credited to a cere-
bral vascular accident.7 '
Finally, no statute or HRS guideline called for an annual check of
dilantin blood level in this type of setting. 5 Indeed, the expert did not
testify to a minimum standard of care, but said, "I think an optimum
standard of care is to do it at least once a year."716 Accordingly, the
judge concluded that since the statute does not define "neglect" as fail-
ure to extend optimum care, no competent or substantial evidence laid
out a minimum statutory standard." Therefore, without notice of the
prevailing benchmarks of professional care, the defendant's right to due
process had been violated. 8
V. PENSION AND SUPPORT ISSUES
The question of whether a husband's disability pension may be
69. Id.
70. Id.




75. d. at 958.
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cast as a marital asset was at the heart of Hoffner v. Hoffner.7 9 The
lower court had awarded the wife part of her ex-husband's disability
pension as permanent periodic alimony, treating these regular pay-
ments as a marital asset which survived the wife's remarriage. 80
While the court of appeal acknowledged that there would be times
when a future-vesting pension would hold all the earmarks of marital
property, it is not so when the spouse is presently drawing benefits. 81
Under these circumstances, the pension acts as a proxy for future lost
income, and that lies beyond the reach of a former spouse.82 Although
the pension was not marital property, subject to equitable distribution,
it could continue to be a source of alimony.8 3 Accordingly, the lower
court was free to count pension distributions as income in arriving at
the proper amount of alimony.8 ' However, unlike marital property, the
wife's claim to a share of the pension is terminated by her re-marriage
or the death of either spouse.8 5
In contrast, the court of appeal in Lovelady v. Lovelady, con-
cluded that a husband's pension plan should be treated as a marital
asset in calculating the proper amount of alimony. 6
In Town of Davie Police Pension Fund v. Cummings, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that a public pension fund was immune
to a garnishment claim by a creditor of a police officer over an out-
standing debt. 7
Nowadays, and with regard to support, grandparents are thrust
more and more into the role of surrogate parents to their grandchil-
dren. In Wilson v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,
a court had placed two children in their wayward mother's custody as
long as she lived under the watchful eye of the children's grand-
mother.8 8 Although the children's mother was drawing food stamps, the
grandmother suspected the children were being shortchanged.8 9 For
this reason, the grandmother applied separately for food stamps for the
79. 577 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).




84. Hoffner, 577 So. 2d at 704.
85. Id.
86. 576 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
87. 576 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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children, averring their status as one of an independent food stamp
household, apart from their mother and grandparents."
In the course of administrative hearings, HRS ruled that the
grandmother was acting as a "custodial parent," that she and her hus-
band were a part of the children's food stamp household, and because
the household income exceeded the cap on eligibility, the application
was denied. 91
In a reversal of fortunes, the First District Court of Appeal judged
the agency's definition of a "food stamp household" tightfisted and,
moreover, at odds with federal eligibility standards.9" Indeed, federal
law carves out an exception to the definition of a parent-child house-
hold when "one of the parents . . . is an elderly or disabled member.""
As it turned out, appellant Wilson's 82-year-old husband handily met
the federal definition of elderly.94
The only other roadblock bearing on food stamp eligibil-
ity-whether the putative food stamp household routinely buys food
and prepares meals together-was not addressed by the administrative
hearing officer and the court remanded for further attention on this
matter.9 11
VI. CRIMES AGAINST THE ELDERLY
Florida lawmakers recently stiffened penalties for assault and bat-
tery when the victim is sixty-five years of age or older.96 The measure's
language, however, is unclear about whether the "knowingly" element
of the offense refers to the assault and battery or whether it means that
the aggressor must know that his victim is elderly.
In State v. Nelson, the trial court ruled that "knowingly" cannot
bear on the assault and battery offense because intent is already part of
its definition.9" The Fourth District Court of Appeal reluctantly agreed,
but at the same time cast doubt on whether the lawmakers seriously
intended that the state would have to prove the criminal knew the vic-
tim was sixty-five years or older before the stepped-up sanction could
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1988)).
93. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1988).
94. Wilson, 561 So. 2d at 663 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2012(r)(1) (1988)).
95. Id.
96. FLA. STAT. § 784.08(2) (1989).
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be applied.98 After all, the court wryly noted, the law was adopted to
protect the elderly, not the criminal.99
In support of its reading of the law, the court assayed identical
wording in another penal code provision that sharpens penalties when
the victim of assault and battery is a law enforcement officer or
firefighter. The Florida Supreme Court interpreted the word "know-
ingly" to mean "that the accused know that his victim is a law enforce-
ment officer or firefighter."'' 0 But, the "knowingly" element makes
more sense in the situation where off-duty police officers or fire fighters
are not identifiable as such. By contrast, calling on the state to prove
that the defendant knew his victim was elderly is an intolerable burden.
While the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion re-
cently on a similar matter, 10 the Fourth District Court of Appeal pru-
dently aligned itself with Florida Supreme Court precedent for the time
being.
VII. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND ISSUES OF REPRESENTATION
Availability of attorney's fees earned from efforts to force HRS to
hand over its report on nursing home abuse was taken up by the Third
District Court of Appeal in Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services. v. Martin.102 After Idora Smith died in a nursing home at the
end of 1988, HRS conducted an investigation under chapter 415 of
Florida law'08 in response to grapevine reports of elder abuse. Smith's
personal representative, appellee Harriet J. Roberts Martin, enlisted
Herman M. Klemick as counsel to assess the odds of pressing a suc-
cessful wrongful death action against the nursing home.104 HRS stead-
fastly refused to hand over to Klemick the fruits of its chapter 415
investigation under the mistaken belief that access was blocked by
chapter 415.105 Striking a balance between accommodating Klemick
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Street v. State, 383 So. 2d 900, 901 (Fla. 1980) (emphasis added).
101. See United States v. Williams, 922 F.2d 737 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the government need only prove that a person was under age eighteen when employed
in the commission of a drug offense, not that defendant knew the person was under
eighteen).
102. 574 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
103. See Adult Protective Service Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 415.101-.608 (1987).
104. Martin, 574 So. 2d at 1223.
105. Id. at 1224 (citing FLA. STAT. § 415.107(2)(d) (1987)).
[Vol. 16
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and covering its own hide, HRS suggested Klemick invite the probate
court to order the agency to turn over its findings, but the probate
court would not go along.106 Finally, Klemick got his hands on the
chapter .415 file by suing for access under chapters 119 and 415.107
After an in camera inspection, the trial court released the report to
appellee Martin. 108
Seeking his just desserts, Klemick moved for an award of attor-
ney's fees under chapter 119.109 The trial court awarded not only attor-
ney's fees, but costs as well and HRS appealed. 110 The Third District
Court of Appeal upended the award of attorney's fees upon a close
reading of chapter 119. Under this chapter, fees are recoverable "[i]f a
civil action is filed against an agency to enforce the provisions of this
chapter .. ."I" Disclosure of HRS' report was ordered under chapter
415, not chapter 119 which squarely shields from public scrutiny
records of abuse investigations."' Unhappily for Klemick, attorney's
fees are not authorized under chapter 415.113
In the case of In re Skinner, " " Indian River County and HRS
squared off over which one should shoulder attorney's fees incurred on
behalf of Lloyd H. Skinner, a disabled 82-year-old caught in the cross-
fire. HRS had gone to court seeking protective services under Chapter
41511 5 for the elderly man who had been victimized by his caretaker,
Julia Bri:nson." 6 At the same time the court authorized the protective
services, it appointed attorney Martin E. Wall to serve as Skinner's
counsel and later charged the county for Wall's fees. 17
Finding no guidance on this matter under Chapter 415, the trial
court cast about in state law until it hit upon section 43.28 which
prescribes "[t]he counties shall provide appropriate courtrooms, facili-
ties, equipment, and, unless provided by the state, personnel necessary
106. Id.
107. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-.14 (1987).
108. Martin, 574 So. 2d at 1224.
109. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 119.12 (1987).
110. Martin, 574 So. 2d at 1224.
111. FLA. STAT. § 119.12(1) (1987) (emphasis added).
112. Martin, 574 So. 2d at 1224.
113. Id.
114. 541 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
115. See FLA. STAT. § 415.105(3) (Supp. 1986).
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to operate the circuit and country courts."118
The district court of appeal agreed that neither Chapter 415 nor
its legislative history shed light on which public body should pay the
tab for appointed counsel." 9 Turning to case law, the court reviewed In
the Interest of D.B. & D.S. ° where the Florida Supreme Court had
pinned appointed counsel fees on the county citing section 43.28 in a
case involving juvenile dependency proceedings. Drawing upon the kin-
ship between juvenile dependency proceedings and protective services
proceedings, the District Court concluded the county must pay Mr.
Wall's fees, glossing over the fact that appointed counsel in juvenile
proceedings is constitutionally founded while appointed counsel in pro-
ceedings for the elderly rests on statute.' 2'
In a footnote, the court distinguished decisions burdening HRS
with appointed counsel fees because in those cases counsel was not le-
gally required. 22 Finally, the court of appeal supported its assessment
of fees against the county on policy grounds as well. Conflicting loyal-
ties are likely to emerge whenever HRS seeks protective services at the
same time that it must pay for counsel to resist the agency's efforts in
such proceedings. To be sure, HRS may well think twice before trig-
gering protective services if it knows it must pay counsel fees.
In an unusual advisory opinion, Florida Bar re Advisory Opin-
ion-Nonlawyer Preparation of Pension Plans,'23 the Florida Supreme
Court tackled the sensitive subject of nonlawyer preparation of em-
ployee pension plans. Federal law, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)124 regulates the preparation of pension
plans and authorizes such nonlawyers as certified public account-
ants-to prepare pension plans for Internal Revenue Service approval.
Crafting pension plans also calls for tax, actuarial, accounting, econom-
ics, insurance and investment advice.
The opinion, with Solomonic wisdom, sorted out those things only
lawyers can do and those things nonlawyers can do. Nonlawyers can
gather information and digest it to arrive at plan options for clients.'2
What is more, nonlawyers can explain alternatives to employers, pre-
118. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 43.28 (1987) (emphasis added)).
119. Skinner, 541 So. 2d at 782.
120. 385 So. 2d 83, 86 (Fla. 1980).
121. Skinner, 541 So. 2d at 782.
122. Id. at 782 n.1.
123. 571 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1990).
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
125. Advisory Opinion, 571 So. 2d at 437-38.
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pare annual returns and reports incident to pension plan administra-
tion, administer the plan day-to-day, and market and sell pension
plans. 2 6
On the other hand, only lawyers may analyze client information
and counsel clients on the best plan, draft plan documents, qualify
plans before the IRC, and terminate a pension plan. 1' 7 Moreover, the
nonlawyer professionals may not select the attorney for the em-
ployer. 28 Even a lawyer working in a nonlawyer company cannot draft
pension plans or select plan options for a customer of the company. 29
The Court acknowledged that pension planning draws on several
overlapping professional disciplines. A similar issue was addressed by
the Florida Supreme Court in Florida Bar v. Turner.80 Like the deci-
sion at bar, Turner ruled that some work connected with structuring
pension plans could legitimately be performed by nonlawyers, but that
other components could only be rendered by attorneys.' 3' Unfortu-
nately, the lines drawn by Turner were fuzzy, spawning confusion, with
lawyers reading the decision narrowly and nonlawyer professionals
resolving doubts in their favor. This confusion prompted the Standing
Committee to issue an opinion. The State Bar introduced evidence that
the public was being harmed because nonlawyer practitioners were
more concerned with the sale of a product or service other than the
plan itself'. At the same time, nonlawyers are unable to gauge the im-
pact of the plan on other legal areas such as estate tax or probate plan-
ning. Ideally, the client is best served when all the experts, legal and
nonlegal, have a say in the shape of the plan.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 438.
128. Id. at 440.
129. Id. at 441.





Published by NSUWorks, 1991
